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Abstract. This paper presents the Password Security Visualizer (PSV),
an interactive visualization system specifically designed for password se-
curity education. PSV can be seen as a reconfigurable “box” containing
different proactive password checkers (PPCs) and visualizers of password
security information, allowing it to be used like a “many in one” or “hy-
brid” PPC. PSV can provide many new features that do not exist in
traditional PPCs, thus having a greater potential to achieve its goals
of educating users. Using purely client-side Web-based technologies, we
implemented a prototype of PSV as an open-source software tool on a
2-D animated canvas. To evaluate the actual performance of our imple-
mented PSV prototype against traditional PPCs, we conducted a semi-
structured interview involving 20 human participants. Our qualitative
analysis of the results showed that PSV was considered the most in-
formative and recommended by most participants as a good educational
tool. To the best of our knowledge, PSV is the first system combining dif-
ferent PPCs together for user education, and the user study is the first of
this kind on comparing educational effectiveness of different PPCs (and
PPC-like password security tools such as PSV).
Keywords: Password, security, visualization, password strength, pass-
word checker, password strength meter, password cracking
1 Introduction
Despite being older than half a century, passwords remain the mostly-used form
for user authentication, which can be attributed to their simplicity (ease to
use) and cost effectiveness. Because the pervasive use of passwords, they are
frequently targeted in cyber attacks and many large-scale password leakage in-
cidents have been reported especially in recent years [9, 23]. Password strength-
ening technologies such as password hashing and salting have been developed
to provide more protection on passwords stored on the server side, but hu-
man users remain a weak link because they often choose weak passwords to
compromise security for usability, thus making password cracking much more
effective [11,17,32,33].
In order to avoid the use of weak passwords by human users, many technolo-
gies have been developed to assist users and network administrators. Password
checkers are among the most widely-used technologies for this purpose. Pass-
word checkers are software tools used to check the strength of given passwords
in order to detect and/or prevent use of weak passwords. There are two types of
password checkers: proactive password checkers (PPCs) and reactive password
checkers (RPCs). PPCs are client-side tools interacting with end users when they
are creating passwords and giving immediate feedback on the user interface to
inform users about the password strength. They are often combined with pass-
word policies so that known weak passwords are banned. RPCs are server-side
tools performing regular scans of the password database by launching simulated
password cracking attempts. Detected weak passwords by RPCs will be sent to
network administrators and/or affected users for actions. In this paper, we focus
on PPCs because they can offer more opportunities to educate end users directly.
A PPC needs to work with one or more password strength metering (PSM)
algorithms, each of which normally returns a numerical or categorical value in-
dicating the overall strength of a given password3. Many researchers use the
term “PSM” (password strength meters) or simply “password meters” for PPCs,
which can lead to confusion. In this paper, we used the term PSM for the un-
derlying (“invisible”) algorithms calculating password strength and PPC for the
(“visible”) software system with a clear user interface, empowered by one or
more PSMs, to inform users about the strength of a given password.
PPCs are normally not designed for educational purposes, but can achieve
such goals as a natural byproduct (e.g., by repeatedly using PPCs a user can nat-
urally gain knowledge about password security). Insights learned from research
work on PPCs and PSMs [4,5,26–28] have suggested that educating users about
password security and attacks is an important aspect to make PPCs more effec-
tive, but very few tools have been developed and evaluated for this purpose.
This paper tries to fill the gap between password checking and user education
by presenting Password Security Visualizer (PSV), an interactive visualization
system specifically designed for password security education. PSV extends the
main concepts behind all PPCs to a reconfigurable “box” containing different
proactive password checkers and other non-PPC tools for visualizing useful in-
formation around the security of a given password, where “reconfigurable” refers
to the capability of adding new PPCs into and removing existing ones from the
PSV “box”. Although being designed as an educational tool, PSV can still be
used like a normal PPC, with much richer information about the security of the
given password. To some extent, in addition to being a password security educa-
tion tool, PSV can also be seen a “many in one” or “hybrid” PPC.4 At the user
interface (UI) level, PSV can be designed in many different ways, two of which
will be explained in this paper. Using purely client-side Web-based technologies,
we implemented one possible PSV design as an open-source software tool on a
2-D animated canvas. We followed some educational principles to design and
3 In principle, a PSM algorithm can return more than one value each representing a
different aspect of the password strength. Such algorithms are however very rare.
4 We originally developed PSV as Visual Password Checker (VPC) [10], which was
later extended/renamed to be more education-oriented rather than yet another PPC.
implement PSV, so we hoped it can a greater potential to achieve its goals of
educating users. To evaluate the actual performance of the PSV prototype, we
conducted a semi-structured interview with 20 human participants. Since there
are not many other password security education tools and PPCs do have a side
feature of educating users about password security, we decided to compare our
PSV prototype’s performance with three different designs of existing PPCs. Our
results suggested that our PSV prototype was considered the most informative
tool for educating users about password security.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In the next section we present
related work on PPCs. Section 3 discuss design considerations of PSV, and Sec-
tion 4 gives details on the web-based PSV prototype system. In Sec. 5 we explain
how we conducted the semi-structured interview and analyzed the results. The
final section concludes the paper with further discussions and future work.
2 Related Work
PPCs can be traced back to research work conducted in the early 1990s [11,15].
Nowadays PPCs have become ubiquitous on computer systems and websites,
as a standard component of the password creation and update processes. The
basic functionality of a PPC is to give immediate feedback on the strength of
the password the user is entering so that the user can make a more informed
decision on if the current password is strong enough to be used.
It has been observed that PPCs could influence users to choose stronger
passwords [4,5,27], but users can also be confused by inappropriate/inconsistent
strength ratings given by different PPCs [3]. Much research [13, 16, 24, 31, 34]
has therefore been done to develop more robust PSMs so that the estimated
password strength matches the actual risk against password crackers better.
At the UI level, some studies [5, 29] have showed that the PPC UI design
matters in terms of influencing users to create stronger passwords, and some
designs could be more effective. The most common UI design is a (horizontal or
vertical) 1-D bar (or segmented box) showing the estimated password strength
score as a progress bar, a colored bar/box, and sometimes a very short textual
description such as “weak” and “very strong” as well. Some PPCs also show a
more detailed textual description (maybe visible only after a link/button being
clicked), which can cover recommendations on how to improve the current pass-
word and password policies. Some PPCs choose to use different PSMs e.g. those
based on peer pressure [24] and fear appeal [29], which also require the UI to
be designed differently. Among all PPCs we are aware of, one PPC [25] is quite
unique in displaying multiple 1-D bars, which show details about how the overall
password strength score is calculated based on multiple sub-ratings. Although
the multi-bar PPC is much more informative, Ciampa found out it is the hardest
to understand compared with other simpler PPCs [5]. The general absence of
clear feedback and sufficient information about the returned password strength
scores in PPCs can leave users confused about why a password is given a specific
rating by a PPC thus let them choose to neglect PPCs and depend on their own
subject judgments on passwords [4, 26].
Ciampa studied the effectiveness of four different UI designs on password
feedback mechanisms in PPCs [5]. Besides a common 1-D bar PPC, he also ex-
amined (1) a dial reading based PPC [20], (2) a fear appeal based PPC [30],
(3) the multi-bar PPC “The Password Meter” [25]. His results showed that the
fear appeal based PPC is the most effective among all the four tested feedback
mechanisms on influencing users towards stronger passwords. However, the ma-
jority of participants were observed preferring the multi-bar PPC, even though
it was the hardest to understand. Ciampa also reported the need of supporting
users with the required security level based on the used context.
Ur et al. conducted a comparative study on PPCs used by 14 popular websites
in 2012 [27]. They found out that most PPCs studied have a simple 1-D bar based
UI design. They also found out that different PPCs’ appearances did not have
major effect on either users’ attitudes or password arrangement. Although using
PPCs did motivate users to creating longer passwords, which were not observed
to be less memorable, users often did not have a clue about the reason behind
ratings given by PPCs, which might cause confusion and mislead them when
improper PSMs are used. They also found out that participants had tended
to select weaker passwords when they became frustrated, and lost trust in the
PPC. Similar observations around the psychological phenomenon “frustration”
and “discomfort” were also reported by Haque et al. in a 2014 study [8].
Two more recent studies [26, 28] suggested that many users do have prior
knowledge on how to strengthen their passwords, but they do not always follow
the knowledge to create strong passwords in real world. One study [26] further
suggested that this knowledge-behavior gap may be the result of neglecting to
educate users about different attacks to passwords.
Furnell’s study [6] revealed great inconsistencies among PPCs on 10 popular
websites, and the password composition recommendations given by those web-
sites were largely unclear and insufficient to guide users. The same observations
were reported by de Carne´ de Carnavalet and Mannan in their work [3], in which
they examined 13 PPCs deployed at 11 widely-used web services.
Komanduri et al. proposed a system called Telepathwords [12], which predicts
most likely weak passwords based on the current password as the prefix and
show them to alert users about such choices (since guessable passwords are
weak). Telepathwords is not a PPC per the standard definition, but it show the
security of the current password in a different way to guide users. They reported
that the quality of passwords created using Telepathwords were higher than a
number of PPCs they used for comparison. However, although users found that
the feedback given by Telepathwords was helpful, many of them also reported
it being difficult and annoying to use. This again highlighted the difficulty of
designing good password security tools.
Some recently-reported personalized attacks on passwords [13,32] imply that
PSMs and PPCs need to be personalized and contextualized. This is also echoed
by Loge et al.’s work on a PPC for Android unlock patterns [14], in which they
observed that the password strength could be influenced by individual features
such as age and gender.
3 Password Security Visualizer (PSV): Design
Considerations
Our overall aim for PSV is to help enhance users’ overall understanding of pass-
word security, based on what we have learned from existing PPCs and other
password security tools with an educational effect. This lets us to reflect about
what users truly need if we want to educate them about password security, even-
tually leading us to design PSV as a system going beyond password checking.
Our main design goals for PSV include: (1) to help users gain more knowledge
and have less confusions on all aspects of password security, including but not
limited to password strength, (2) to highlight the complexity of password secu-
rity by externalizing inconsistencies between different PPCs and more advanced
attacks on passwords; (3) to engage users actively so that the process of learn-
ing is enjoyable, (4) to produce an open system that can be easily executed and
customized by users on different platforms.
To achieve those design goals, we decided to follow some well-established
design principles to design and implement PSV. In the following, we will discuss
those design principles, which will be followed by two example designs and a
discussion on some key supporting algorithms running in the background.
3.1 Design Principles
For designing PSV, we followed a number of widely-recognized principles across
different application domains [1, 22], including cyber security [35]. Here, we ex-
plain all these principles and discuss how we considered them for PSV.
Informative feedback: This principle aims to provide users with essential and
sufficient information to make more informed decisions [22]. This has been ob-
served for many simple PPCs where users only see a single rating of the given
password without any further information on why the password is rated as such
and what to do to improve. Therefore, supporting users with more informative
feedback could help raise their awareness on password security and correct any
misconceptions, which in turn will help them to make better security-related
decisions such as choosing a stronger password.
The informative feedback PSV can provide include different aspects of pass-
word security such as the following (but not limited to these) categories: (1)
basic password attributes such as length, types of characters used, and struc-
tural information e.g. repeated patterns or character transformation rules, (2)
risks against simple and advanced dictionary-based attacks, and (3) an overall
password strength like what is given by a typical PPCs or PSM. For the third
category, it will be beneficial to show estimates from multiple PPCs and PSMs to
inform users about the complexity and limitations around the overall password
strength estimation, thus educating them that they should not blindly follow an
arbitrary PPC or PSM. Being able to understand the complexity and limita-
tions will also help them become less confused when they enter such inconsistent
ratings of different PPCs/PSMs. PSV will thus include a number of Password
Information Units (PIUs), each showing one aspect of password security.
While offering more information is in general helpful, we must not lose sight
of implications for overloading users with too much information, which can harm
their learning performance. After a certain point, information overload will oc-
cur, which consequently may prevent users from processing the provided infor-
mation. This requires controlling the amount of information shown to users by
adapting some strategies (e.g., filtering and zooming). Some other principles
discussed below can help in this regard as well.
Visualization: Information visualization can facilitate exploring and under-
standing rich information at a glance to attract users’ interest and motivate
them to learn, so it has been advocated by researcher over textual contents for
superior learning outcome [35]. Most PPCs already support some level of visual-
ization, however, this needs further strengthening in PSV as there will be more
PIUs and more interactions with users. One focus will be to minimize possible
distractions caused by too many PIUs and visualization itself.
Segmentation and contiguity: Both principles can help to manage informa-
tion being presented by reducing its complexity, thus helping users to understand
the information better. Segmentation is about breaking information into small
chunks [35]. This may involve grouping related information into different units.
Contiguity is about keeping related information near to each other to maintain a
smoother information flow, which can help users to achieve a better comprehen-
sion of the information presented [35]. For PSV, the segmentation principle is
naturally done by grouping information into PIUs. We will need to consider how
to map each PIU to visual features such as shape, size, orientation, etc. Figure 1
shows two examples of how the combination of shapes and orientations can be
used to map various PIUs. The contiguity principle can be applied by providing
more detailed information about each PIU (e.g., using a pop-up tooltip) while
the user is interacting with the PIU. The additional information should be placed
close to the PIU of interest so the information contiguity is maintained.
Signaling: This principle is about drawing users’ attention to significant in-
formation only if it is necessary, which can help enhance users’ learning perfor-
mance [35]. For PSV, different visual features can be used to signal important
information in each PIU. Information can be signaled by many distinct visual
features (e.g., more prominent color, unique shape, larger size, animation, change
of styles, etc.). For example, different icons or shapes can be used to indicate
different information categories of a PIU, and a PIU’s location relative to a refer-
ence can signal a specific level of risk. Such signaling can help users to recognize
important information more quickly. Another example is about using animation:
a PIU can move smoothly from an old location to a new one once its risk level
changes. This interactive visualization could help raise users’ awareness on such
risk changes w.r.t. any changes to the password being evaluated, thus achieving
a better understanding of how password security risks are estimated and why.
Interactive and immediate feedback: It is known that providing interactive
and immediate feedback to users can foster their learning performance [22, 35].
Immediate feedback can help to engage users via giving them a quick chance
to reflect on what they just learned [35], and interactivity would allow users to
absorb complex concepts and enjoy the learning process more. All PPCs have
this principle built-in since the password strength estimate is always updated
immediately when any change to the current password is made. For PSV, we can
provide users with more interactive and immediate feedback by drawing users’
attention to important security issues beyond the password strength estimate.
For example, the interactive fear appeal idea proposed in [29] can be used to warn
users about potential risk of password attacks immediately after a weak password
is detected against some specific attacks. The risk level can be visualized by a
number of “negative” icons such as skulls to achieve the fear appeal effect.
Reconfigurability and personalization: Further information enrichments are
also obtainable from allowing the system to be easily reconfigured. Such recon-
figuration can allow users to create a personalized space to enhance their learning
experience and gain more relevant knowledge [1]. As far as we know, all existing
PPCs are designed to offer the same information to all users, which cannot adapt
to different users’ needs. To support reconfigurability and personalization, spe-
cial UI elements and lower-level programming interfaces should be introduced in
PSV to allow easy addition and removal of PIUs and other supporting compo-
nents (e.g. PPCs, PSMs, password dictionaries and personal information), and
also easy modification of the behavior and look of each PIU and any supporting
algorithm. Different levels of reconfigurability and personalization can be sup-
ported, ranging from simple information filtering to customization of how an
individual PIU or component looks/works and to even completely change of the
look or working mechanism of the whole system.
Portability: This principle is about the need to make a system more available
when users are moving across devices and platforms. An installation-free system
that can run cross different platforms will be ideal. For PSV, a natural choice
is to implement it as a web-based system based on pure client-side technologies
(HTML, CSS and JavaScript) so that any computing device and OS with a
standard-compliant web browser can allow the user to use PSV.
3.2 Two Example Designs
Following all the design principles discussed above, we can have many different
designs of PSV. To accommodate more information and enrich interactions with
users, it is necessary to move from the simple 1-D bar based design of most
PPCs to a large space for visualization. In other words, we need to use a 2-D
or a 3-D space to show a number of visualized PIUs. The space should have a
layout easy for reconfiguration and personalization. To balance informativeness
and information overload, the information shown in PSV can be put into several
layers and visual metaphors can be used to invite users to interact with each
PIU to get more detailed information related to the PIU. Since working with a
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Fig. 1. Two example designs of PSV on a 2-D canvas, which is divided into (a) hori-
zontal bars and (b) concentric circles representing different levels of security risk.
2-D space is easier and requires less computation, we decided to adhere to 2-D
designs but will consider extensions to 3-D spaces in future.
Two example designs of PSV on a 2-D canvas are shown in Fig. 1. In both
designs, the following groups of PIUs are included: 1) a number of PPCs showing
the overall strength of the current password; 2) a number of PIUs showing basic
password attributes (PA); 3) a number of weak passwords closer to the current
password. Each weak password is visualized as an icon with a negative meaning
following the fear appeal concept (e.g. a skull) and located at a position propor-
tional to the edit distance (ED) [18] between the weak password and the current
password. The number of weak passwords around the current password can be
used as a proxy of the level of risk against dictionary-based attacks: the closer a
dictionary entry to the current password and the more such entries are around,
the more risky the current password is. The edit distance between a weak pass-
word and the current password can be related to a hybrid password attack which
combines a dictionary-based attack with a simple brute force up to a number
of character changes. The whole canvas can be extended to accommodate more
PIUs easily, and removing or relocating existing PIUs is easy as well.
3.3 Supporting Algorithms
Different PIUs in PSV require a range of supporting algorithms which include
at least the following groups.
PSMs: PSV can include a number of PPCs as PIUs and as mentioned before
each PPC needs to work with one or more PSMs.
Password dictionary handling algorithms: PSV will support dictionary-based
attacks so some algorithms will be needed to read and search in one or more dic-
tionaries. A trie-based data structure can be used to efficiently store dictionaries
and to accelerate the search process. A major subset of algorithms in this group
are for detecting weak passwords with a specific edit distance. Another subset
of algorithms are for calculating the edit distance between two given strings.
Algorithms linking PSMs with PIUs: For some designs of PSV, the location
of a PPC (as a PIU) is used to signal the password strength estimated (e.g., in
the second design shown in Fig. 1). In this case, some algorithm will be needed to
translate the password strength estimated to a location in the visualized space.
Algorithms for selecting and positioning of PIUs: Since multiple PIUs are
displayed in a limited space, some algorithms are needed to decide what PIUs to
show (how many) and where. Dynamic adjustment to some PIUs (e.g., reducing
the size of a PIU or rotating it) may also be considered. These algorithms need
to consider prioritization and randomization when not all PIUs can be shown
due to limited space.
Parallelization and pre-computation algorithms: To ensure immediate feed-
back to users, the visualization of all PIUs needs to be fast enough to catch up
with the typing speed of the user, even on relatively less powerful computing
devices (e.g., smart phones). This requires most time-consuming computation to
be done in an asynchronous manner (e.g., using HTML5 workers and AJAX),
and be parallelized as much as possible. Pre-computation should be included,
e.g., when a new character is added into the current password, each dictionary
trie does not need to be searched from scratch, but from the last visited node.
4 Our PSV Prototype
We implemented a prototype of the second example design of PSV shown in
Fig. 1(b). This prototype is developed using pure client-side web technologies in-
cluding HTML5, CSS and JavaScript, which makes the prototype highly portable.
We also made a simple interface for the PSV prototype to be incorporated into
password creation/update pages of any HTML5-ready websites. The prototype
can be found online at http://passwords.sccs.surrey.ac.uk/PSV/. In this
section, we describe how we implemented the front-end and back-end parts of
the prototype.
4.1 Front-end UI
The PSV prototype includes three groups of visual elements: a 2-D canvas, a
configuration panel and a number of PIUs.
2-D canvas and overall look. A 2-D canvas is used as the container of PIUs.
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the PSV prototype’s canvas whose background
is rendered as an active radar with a rotating beam “scanning” for security
concerns constantly (indicating the working status of PSV). The radar canvas
as a visual metaphor matches the cyber security context well, which was the
main reason why we decided to go for the second example design of PSV. The
center of the radar canvas represents the current password and a number of
(three as a default value, which is reconfigured) concentric circles are drawn
to accommodate all PIUs. The three concentric circles allow us to locate weak
passwords with a particular distance with the current password (following the
segmentation principle). Other PIUs (mainly PPCs) are mapped to any point
from the radar center to the largest circle linearly so that the distance to the
center represents the level of risk. A PIU will disappear if the risk is considered
lower than a threshold (the value corresponding to the largest circle) so that it
is unnecessary to show it any longer. From a user’s perspective, while he/she is
entering a password the radar canvas is dynamically updated with immediate
feedback (via relevant PIUs), and the task of defining a strong password is to
remove as many (ideally all) PIUs out of the radar so that no risks are visible
(i.e., high). When the task is not to define a password, the user can play with the
system by entering different passwords to learn more about password security.
The design allows easy reconfiguration and personalization as a PIU can be easily
added to or removed from the 2-D canvas. Each PIU’s look and settings can also
be configured separately or as a group (e.g., one can refine how a PPC is located
by introducing a new linear or nonlinear mapping between the password strength
estimate and the distance to the radar center). For three example passwords,
Figure 3 shows how the whole PSV’s UI looks like.
Fig. 2. The screenshot of an example user registration page of our PSV prototype.
PIUs. There are four different types of PIUs we include in our PSV prototype.
Password attributes are not currently included because we found them least
useful for user education purposes. We may add some in future versions.
The first type is the center of the 2-D canvas. As mentioned above, the center
represents the current password. We use a small circle filled with a specific color
to visualize three different states: light blue (normal), red (the password itself
is a weak password), yellow (the password contains at least one weak password
(a) app (b) app1e (c) 46r68ffytd
Fig. 3. Screenshots when three passwords were being entered into our PSV prototype.
segment). On top of the small circle the current password is shown in clear. We
do not hide the password since PSV is designed as an educational tool. If the
PSV is used as a PPC, the password can be simply removed or asterisks are
shown as usual.
The second type covers PPCs. The current version incorporates four PPCs
based on the common 1-D bar design: a PPC we developed based on the NIST
password entropy [2] as the underlying PSM, the open-source password checker
zxcvbn (which has been deployed by Dropbox) [34]5, the PPCs used by Microsoft
and Yahoo! (for which we implemented our own versions). Note that the four
are just used as examples and more PPCs can be added easily.
The third type covers weak passwords signaling the risks against dictionary-
based attacks. We use a skull icon by following the fear appeal concept used by
some PPCs such as those in [29]. Our prototype considers three different types
of dictionary attacks to detect weak passwords related to the current password:
1) naive dictionary attack where each entry is checked as is, 2) smart dictionary
attack where some common character transformation rules are considered, and
3) targeted dictionary attack where the user’s personal information is used to
build a small personalized dictionary. As a demonstrator, the targeted dictionary
attack currently gets the user’s first and last names by asking them to log into
his/her Facebook account via the Facebook API. This can be extended to cover
more personal information such as what was used in [13,32].
The last type covers tool-tips that are shown when the user moves mouse over
any PPC or weak password. Such tool-tips provide more detailed explanation
to the corresponding PIU in order to provide more information about the risks
of concern and guidance on how to reduce such risks. A unique part of the
information shown on each tool-tip is about weak password segments, which are
highlighted using different colors so that users are encouraged not to include
any dictionary entries in their passwords. This can educate users about attacks
combining multiple dictionaries. In addition, when a character transformation is
applied to match a dictionary entry, the tool-tip will highlight the transformation
to inform users about the risks of smart dictionary attacks.
5 We incorporated an older version of the PPC zxcvbn downloaded from https://
github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn.
Fig. 4. The menu bar of our PSV prototype.
Configuration panel. To support reconfigurability and personalization, we
also created a configuration panel as part of our PSV prototype on the top of
the 2-D canvas. The configuration panel has two versions, one is shown in Fig. 4
for a typical layout on a PC, and a more mobile-friendly version as shown in
Fig. 2 which breaks down the menu items into smaller items. The configuration
panel empowers the user to make the following changes to the behavior and look
of the PSV prototype.
Information filtering: The panel provides two ways to filter information shown
on the 2-D canvas: a slider enabling dynamic control of the number (i.e., den-
sity) of weak passwords shown on the canvas, and a number of menu items to
switch some types of PIUs on or off which includes indirect control via enabling
or disabling existing password dictionaries and password attacks.
Adding new dictionaries: The PSV prototype allows users to add their own
dictionaries into the system. This include personalized and normal dictionaries
through “Facebook” and “New Dic” menu items, respectively. Normal dictionar-
ies added will be stored in the system and can be enabled/disabled as built-in
dictionaries, while the personalized dictionary is only accessible in the mem-
ory after the user logs into his/her Facebook account and will be released once
he/she logs out.
4.2 Supporting Algorithms
Our PSV prototype is supported by some underlying algorithms for different
purposes, which can be categorized based on five steps of the whole information
processing chain: data storage, creation of candidate PIUs, positioning of PIUs,
selection of PIUs, and visual presentation of selected PIUs. These steps are
explained briefly below.
Data storage. Since multiple dictionaries are used in PSV, we need an effi-
cient data structure and corresponding algorithms for creating and modifying
dictionaries in the selected data structure. For our PSV prototype, we decided
to use the succinct trie data structure implemented by Hanov [7]. A segment of
such a trie can be seen in Fig. 5(a), where red nodes represent dictionary entries
(concatenating all letters from the root node sequentially).
For personalized dictionaries, our PSV prototype currently extracts the user’s
first and last names from his/her Facebook account (after login), which are stored
in the volatile memory and deleted permanently once the user logs out.
Creation of candidate PIUs. To create candidate PIUs that can be further
selected for visualization, some algorithms are needed to produce information
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Fig. 5. The process of searching for weak passwords in a dictionary, where the password
given is “car” and two detected weak passwords are “car” and “carbon”.
needed by all candidate PIUs. Information needed for the current password PIU
is straightforward, so we ignore it here and focus on other three types of PIUs.
Detection of weak passwords: An algorithm was developed to search through
all enabled dictionaries to detect weak passwords whose edit distance from the
current password is not greater than 3. In our prototype, we used Levenshtein
distance as the edit distance since it is the most common metric used [19]. An
example of the searching process is shown in Fig. 5. The results are stored as
an array in which each element represent a weak password. We implemented
multi-threading capability using HTML5 Web workers to improve performance
of the searching process and to avoid blocking the main user interface.
Password strength metering (PSM): To visualize any PPC, the underlying
PSM has to be executed on the current password. For our PSV prototype, there
are four PSMs each serving one PPC. A PSM produces either a numeric value
such as an entropy value or an ordinal value (among three or four different levels)
to represent the strength of a given password.
Tool-tip generation: For each weak password and PPC PIU, a tool-tip object
is also created to contain more detailed information and guidance to users.
Positioning of PIUs. One algorithm is needed to map each PIU type to a
specific position on the 2-D canvas. For weak passwords, they can be naturally
mapped to one of the three circles based on their edit distance from the current
password. For PPCs, this will depend on the format of the password strength
value: 1) if the underlying PSM returns an ordinal value then the PPC can be
naturally mapped to one of the three circles as well (outer circles correspond to
stronger passwords); 2) if the underlying PSM returns a numeric value like an
entropy then the PPC is linearly mapped to a position on a radial line starting
from the center of the 2-D canvas, where the most outer circle will be set to
correspond to a specific value considered as “very strong”.
Selection of PIUs for visualization. Not all candidate PIUs are actually
visualized since the 2-D canvas has a limited space and when a specific risk drops
below a threshold we do not need to show it. For PPCs and weak passwords,
they will disappear if their positions go beyond the most outer circle. Tool-tips
are always hidden since showing them will make the canvas too crowded, instead,
one such tool-tip is shown dynamically when the user moves mouse over a specific
PIU. The maximum number of PIUs shown is automatically calculated based
on the size of the canvas. The configuration panel also allows the user to tailor
the number of weak passwords which will also influence what PIUs are selected.
Visual presentation of selected PIUs. Each PIU type needs an algorithm
to do the actual visualization. This may involve re-positioning selected PIUs,
e.g., re-distributing all weak passwords with the same edit distance uniformly
on the corresponding circle to make them look better, and moving some PIUs
around to avoid conflicts with one or more neighboring PIUs.
5 Semi-structured Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted (by the first co-author of the paper,
referred to “the researcher” hereinafter) to investigate the efficacy of our PSV
prototype on educating users about password security, compared with three
traditional PPCs. Our main goal is to demonstrate PSV as a superior tool for
password security education. This user study was reviewed by the University
of Surrey’s University Ethics Committee (UEC) and a favorable ethics opinion
(FEO) was secured.
To align the UI of our PSV prototype and the three traditional PPCs so that
any differences we observed should be only about the PSV and PPCs themselves,
we designed a uniform login page with four different variants each of which uses
a different password security/checking system. The three traditional PPCs we
used include: 1) zxcvbn – a PPC based on the most common 1-D color bar
design and the widely-used zxcvbn as the underlying PSM [34], 2) PM – the
multi-bar based PPC called “The Password Meter” [25], 3) IFA – the interactive
fear appeal based PPC proposed in [29]. We implemented our own versions of
the three PPCs to ensure the consistent look of the overall login page. Figure 6
shows UIs of the three PPCs we implemented.
5.1 Interview Design
Although being an interview type user study, participants needed to give subjec-
tive opinions on password security/checking tools they might not have any prior
knowledge so the user study also involves a short testing session for each tool.
We also collected some basic demographic information about participants at the
beginning using a questionnaire: age, gender and educational background. The
whole session was conducted on a one-to-one basis to avoid interference between
participants. The interviews were audio-recorded for further analysis, which later
was deleted after being transcribed. Each participant spent around an hour to
complete the whole session and was compensated £10 for their time.
In the testing sessions, each participant was asked to play the role of an
imaginary security consultant to examine each of the four tools by doing the
(a) zxcvbn
(b) PM
(c) IFA
Fig. 6. The UI screenshots of the three PPCs used in our user study.
following for no less than 5 minutes: 1) trying a number of passwords given by
the researcher and of their own choice; 2) paying attention on distinct infor-
mation shown by each tool; 3) trying to understand the information shown; 4)
making notes on different information shown to prepare for the interview with
the researcher. Participants were encouraged to interact actively with the re-
searcher during the assessment tests to simulate real-world scenarios where a
security consultant will normally interact with the vendor of a candidate tool to
get more information about it. Participants were offered to have a break between
testing sessions, but none opted to have one. To minimize the bias caused by
participants’ own prior experience with any of the tested tools and to give par-
ticipants a big picture of what the study is about, the four tools were introduced
to the participants beforehand by the researcher.
The actual interview took place after each participant finished all the four
testing sessions. The researcher asked each participant a number of questions
around the four password security/checking tools to gather his/her subjective
opinions on different aspects of those tools. When a participant asked for clarifi-
cation on any tool, the researcher also provided needed information. Participants
were not told that the PSV tool was developed by us, although at the end of the
interview some asked the researcher if we developed some of the tools.
5.2 Participants
We recruited 20 participants using posters and the online research participation
system (SONA) of School of Psychology, University of Surrey. The gender ratio
was not controlled: we got 14 participants and 7 male. The participants were
in the age range of 19 to 45, with a median age of 22. Most participants were
students from different subjects: psychology (25%), business (30%), engineering
(25%), and others (15%). None of them had a strong knowledge on computer
science or computer security. 70% of them are undergraduate students and 25%
of them are post-graduate students. One participant worked in the University of
Surrey as an administrative assistant.
5.3 Results
PSV as an educational tool: In our interview, we collected information about
the most educative password checkers perceived by participants. We asked them
questions about their newly acquired knowledge after testing the four tools.
Figure 7 shows what all participants collectively said about each tool as a word
cloud. Many participants found the zxcvbn PPC is the least educative, while the
PSV and the PM PPC are the most informative ones. All participants reported
that they had gained some new knowledge from PSV and the PM PPC. Many of
them found that the PSV directly highlights distinct strategies used for guessing
passwords and possible inconsistencies among different PPCs, which they found
interesting due to the richer information presented in a visual manner. As a
comparison, many felt that they had learned about more concrete new rules to
improve password strength from the PM PPC.
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Fig. 7. Mostly highlighted words for the PSV prototype and the three PPCs, each
shown as a word cloud (generated by the online tool WordSift [21]).
At the beginning of the interview, most (18, 90%) participants failed to iden-
tify that the PSV as the most informative password checkers according to their
understanding of informativity (see Table 1). Although they agreed that the PSV
could provide a lot of information but they did not believe such information is
all useful, and the majority felt that the PM PPC is the most informative tool.
However, after explaining different components of the PSV and the PM PPC
with greater details to participants, almost all participants were converted to ar-
ticulate that the PSV is the most informative tool. A few participants remained
their original opinion that the PM PPC is the best, based on the argument that
their subjective judgments match the outcomes from the PM PPC better. Note
that no participants asked for more explanation on the zxcvbn and IFA PPCs
since they are simpler and more straightforward.
Table 1. Participants’ votes on the most informative tool for password security edu-
cation, before and after more details on the PSV and the PM PPC were given.
Password Tool Before After Converted
zxcvbn 0 0 0
IFA 5 0 -5
PM 13 1 -12
PSV 2 19 17
The results on the PM PPC are not totally unexpected since it is indeed
the most informative PPC among the three tested. The results should not be
interpreted negatively against PSV because as a container of PPCs the PM PPC
can also be added to the PSV canvas (which we plan to do in future versions).
We also asked participants which tool (if only one can be selected) they
would recommend to their “customers” (average users, normally not security
professionals) for self-learning password security. 11 participants (55%) preferred
the PSV over the three PPCs, 6 selected the PM PPC, and the remaining 3
selected the IFA PC. None of the participants recommended the zxcvbn PPC
as it does not provide enough feedback to users. Some participants explained
that they did not recommend the PSV mainly because they felt the PM PPC is
easier for average users to understand.
PSV as a PPC: Although our main aim is to measure effectiveness of the PSV
as a password education tool, we also gathered information on to what extent
PSV can be used as a PPC. However, none of the participants considered the
PSV a good PPC. The majority reported that the PSV does not give an overall
estimation of the password strength nor direct instructions for improving the
current password. Yet, they reported the same problems for the zxcvbn PPC.
This suggests that the PSV is probably not worse than the common 1-D bar
based PPCs. Note that our PSV prototype has four such PPCs embedded.
When being asked which PPC is the best, six participants chosen the PM
PPC, arguing that it provides more details about the single password strength
estimate which can help users to trust the PPC more. Three participants chose
the IFA PPC, based on the argument that it provides straightforward instruc-
tions where users will be able to construct passwords faster. Participants who
preferred the IFA PPC also mentioned that the PM PPC would be their second
preferable PPC whose user-friendliness is considered worse than the IFA PPC.
Participants’ trust on PPCs: We also asked participants to what extent they
trust and rely on PPCs. 12 participants (60%) responded to this question. All ex-
cept one responded that they have some level of trust on PPCs. One participant
argued that such trust can be established only with familiar PPCs. One another
participant mentioned he/she always trusts PPCs. Other participants mentioned
that they would ignore a PPC if the PPC’s password strength estimate is higher
than their own subjective judgment. On the other hand, most participants said
that they would make serious efforts to improve their passwords if a PPC gives
a rating lower than their subjective judgment.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents Password Security Visualizer (PSV), a new password secu-
rity educational system and a prototype developed based on proactive password
checkers. We conducted a semi-structured interview based on a number of test-
ing sessions with 20 participants to validate the usefulness of the PSV prototype.
The results of the user study showed that the majority of participants agreed
that PSV is the most educative tools comparing to three traditional types of
PPCs and would recommend it to average users as a self-learning tool on pass-
word security. Participants however were not convinced the PSV is a good al-
ternative PPC considering its lacking an password strength estimate and direct
instructions for improving passwords. More conversations with participants also
revealed that most participants found PPCs useful but their perceptions vary
on what PPC is preferred and when they will follow the ratings of a PPC.
Participants’ responses revealed that the rich information provided by our
PSV prototype was perceived somewhat negatively especially at the very be-
ginning. Some participants seemed confused about what to do with so much
information since the PSV does not give them a single piece of information
(like what traditional PPCs do) which they can simply focus on. This negative
feeling was significantly reduced after we provided clearer instructions on how
the PSV should be used and highlighted its conceptual differences from tradi-
tional PPCs, thus suggesting that the tool may be better used with instructors.
For self-learning purposes, the PSV can be reconfigured to adapt the system’s
features and its UI to each user’s individual preferences and needs.
In our future work, we will study how to improve the current designs and
implementation of PSV to make it more useful as both a user education tool
and an alternative PPC. For instance, we may redesign the PSV so that fewer
PIUs are shown to make the UI less crowded and complicated.
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